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Nearly three decades after Mao’s death and more than fifteen years after the 
Tiananmen uprising, China is still a Leninist Party-state. In fact, one might well 
argue that the prospects for fundamental political transformation look less 
promising today than they did in the 1980s when leaders like Hu Yaobang and 
Zhao Ziyang spearheaded serious, if short-lived, efforts at political reform.
1  But 
while political progress appears to have stalled, the Chinese economy continues 
to demonstrate impressive growth. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, scholarly 
interest in village elections and other signs of “democratization” has in recent 
years been somewhat eclipsed by debates about political economy: can China 
sustain high rates of economic growth without a clear specification of property 
rights, as has occurred in many formerly Communist countries?
2 Will  China 
succumb to the scourge of crony capitalism which has hamstrung a number of 
                                                          
   This paper was originally prepared for presentation at the conference to celebrate the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University 
(December 2005). I am grateful to the conference organizers, Wilt Idema and Roderick 
MacFarquhar, as well as to the many conference participants who raised challenging 
comments and suggestions. 
1  On the early post-Mao experiments in political reform, see Merle Goldman, Sowing the 
Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1994); Shiping Zheng, Party versus State in Post-1949 China: 
The Institutional Dilemma (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). On stalled 
political reform, see Joseph Fewsmith, China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
2 Edward  S.  Steinfeld,  Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jean C. Oi and Andrew G. Walder (eds), 
Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).  
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other developing countries?
3 Or can strong state supervision keep the Chinese 
economic experiment on track—even as it moves steadily toward greater 
privatization and market freedom?
4 The answers to these questions are far from 
clear, in large part because we have such limited understanding of what holds the 
contemporary state structure together and thus allows the political system to 
function as effectively as it does.
5 Moreover, there are no obvious counterparts 
elsewhere in the world to the situation that China currently faces.
6
The Limits of Comparison 
Although the field of Chinese politics has been greatly invigorated by its post-
Mao re-engagement with comparative questions—ranging from civil society and 
democratization to property rights and rent-seeking—the fact is that 
contemporary China is not easily likened to other countries. Longstanding 
differences between Chinese and Soviet Communism have held major 
implications for the course of reform in the two countries.
7  For example, in 
Mao’s communes, unlike Stalin’s collective farms, peasants were paid in 
collectively determined workpoints rather than in state wages, and land 
ownership was vested in the production team rather than the state. This meant 
that, although a return to family farming was eagerly embraced by many rural 
Chinese as a substitute for collective workpoints, issues of land ownership and 
control remain highly contentious—accounting for much of the conflict and 
                                                          
3 Lu  Xiaobo,  Cadres and Corruption: The Organizational Involution of the Chinese 
Communist Party (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000); David C. Kang, Crony 
Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Melanie Manion, Corruption by Design: Building 
Clean Government in Mainland China and Hong Kong (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2004); Yan Sun, Corruption and Market in Contemporary China (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004). 
4  A positive assessment of Chinese state capacity is Dali L. Yang, Remaking the Chinese 
Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004); a negative assessment is Wang Shaoguang, “The Problem of State 
Weakness”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp. 36-42. On the importance of 
state-led economic growth in developing countries more generally, see Atul Kohli, State-
Directed Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
5    Michel Oksenberg noted presciently in 1999 that “such previous depictions as 
‘totalitarianism,’ a ‘Leninist party state,’ ‘fragmented authoritarianism,’ ‘soft 
authoritarianism’ or ‘bureaucratic pluralism’ miss the complexity of China's state structure 
on the eve of the twenty first century”. Michel Oksenberg, “China’s Political System: 
Challenges of the Twenty First Century”, paper prepared for the Keio University 
International Symposium (December 1999). 
6   Andrew G. Walder observes, “The longer China continues along its current trajectory of 
change, the less relevant are the prior examples of collapse and regime change in Eastern 
Europe and the USSR”. Andrew G. Walder, “The Party Elite and China’s Trajectory of 
Change”, China: an International Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (September 2004), p. 190. 
7   Pei  Minxin,  From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communism in China and the 
Soviet Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994).STUDYING CHINESE POLITICS      3 
violence sweeping the Chinese countryside today. But post-Mao authoritarianism 
also departs markedly from garden-variety authoritarian regimes where militarists 
gain power by means of coups d’état (rather than revolutionary mobilization) 
only to preside over bankrupt economies.  
In some respects the “East Asian developmental state”, which afforded a 
fruitful paradigm for the analysis of other rapidly growing economies in the 
region, seems a more promising framework for cross-national comparison than 
either Communism or run-of-the-mill authoritarianism.
8 Yet, as is often noted, 
China’s huge size and heterogeneity render facile comparisons with Japan—let 
alone the “Four Little Tigers” (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong 
Kong)—of limited applicability.
9
In terms of scale and diversity, the only case roughly comparable to China is 
of course India—which has also launched an ambitious program of economic 
liberalization in recent years (beginning in the 1980s, but with particular urgency 
following India’s severe macroeconomic crisis of 1991). Yet the very different 
patterns of reform in the two Asian giants remind us of their starkly divergent 
histories and political systems. While both countries have enjoyed impressive 
economic growth in recent decades,
10  on virtually every standard indicator of 
economic success (gross national product, per capita income, industrialization, 
total factor productivity, exports, capital flows, external debt and the like) China 
has far outpaced its neighbor. Moreover, in terms of quality-of-life measures such 
as literacy and life expectancy, China also notably outperforms India. 
Scholars who have attempted to explain this glaring discrepancy in the two 
countries’ socio–economic development offer contradictory assessments of the 
impact of their respective political systems.
11 Atul Kohli has attributed India’s 
                                                          
8   Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1982); Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed.), The Developmental State (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1999); Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
9   Some have therefore attempted to apply the model at the level of the local rather than the 
national Chinese state, see Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of 
Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). In addition to size, 
however, there are other important differences between the PRC and the Four Tigers; for 
example, Chinese economic development has involved far greater foreign investment than 
was true for its East Asian neighbors. Mary Elizabeth Gallagher, Contagious Capitalism: 
Globalization and the Politics of Labor in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005), pp. 6-7; Yasheng Huang, Selling China: Foreign Direct Investment During the 
Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
10   Between 1980 and 1990, among 122 countries China’s average economic growth rate was 
second-highest and India’s was eleventh. Between 1990 and 2000, China’s was again 
second-highest—among 140 countries—while India ranked tenth. T. N. Srinivasan, 
“Economic Reforms and Global Integration”, in Francine Frankel and Harry Harding (eds), 
The India–China Relationship (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 236.  
11    This is not surprising, inasmuch as larger cross-national studies have been unable to 
establish a significant correlation between either authoritarian regimes or democratic 
regimes and economic growth. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio 4      THE CHINA JOURNAL, No. 57 
relatively lackluster reform results to interest-group gridlock stemming from its 
pluralist democracy.
12 In a similar vein, T. N. Srinivasan notes that in China “the 
firm control held by the party made it much easier than in India to undertake and 
implement reforms ... the success of Chinese reforms has been in part due to 
China’s being an authoritarian society”.
13  Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, by 
contrast, stress that “while India has much to learn from China in the field of 
economic and social policy, the lessons do not include any overwhelming merit 
of its more authoritarian system”.
14 Jagdish Bhagwati, characterizing India as “the 
model that couldn’t”, argues nonetheless that “authoritarianism seems to be 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for rapid growth”.
15
Yet the fact remains that it was during the height of Chinese 
authoritarianism—the Maoist era—that the foundations of contemporary growth 
were laid. Following upon a successful revolution that had been waged and won 
in the countryside, Mao and his comrades devoted unprecedented attention to the 
peasantry. That attention definitely had its dark side—as the horrendous Great 
Leap famine (following the introduction of rural communes) attested. Despite its 
peasant revolution, China suffered what economist Nicholas Lardy characterizes 
as a “puzzling” undervaluation of agriculture for most of the Maoist period. The 
result was chronic poverty for millions of rural dwellers.
16 Even  so,  Mao’s 
revolutionary regime must also be credited with important gains in improving the 
quality of life for much of its populace. Deeply flawed as the Chinese effort 
certainly was, the contrast with India is nonetheless stark. Bhagwati notes that, in 
comparison to China, “the Indian planners underestimated the productive role of 
better health, nutrition, and education and hence underspent on them”.
17 As Dreze 
and Sen acknowledge, “the larger success of the Chinese efforts at social 
progress has been, to a great extent, the result of the stronger political 
commitment of its leadership to eliminating poverty and deprivation”.
18 Rhoads 
Murphey, writing at the end of the Maoist period, attributed China’s relative 
success (vis-à-vis India) in improving rural living standards to “the government’s 
commitment to this idea, and the power of central planning there, backed up by a 
revolutionary ideology and drawing on the immense force of a uniquely 
                                                                                                                               
Cheibub and Fernando Limonqi, Democracy and Development (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
12   Atul  Kohli,  Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
13   T. N. Srinivasan, “Economic Reforms”, pp. 245, 259. 
14   Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 85. 
15   Jagdish Bhagwati, India in Transition: Freeing the Economy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), pp. 20-21.
16    Nicholas R. Lardy, Agriculture in Modern China’s Economic Development (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
17   Jagdish Bhagwati, India in Transition, p. 36. 
18   Jean Dreze and Amartya Sen, India, pp. 85-86. STUDYING CHINESE POLITICS      5 
mobilized population”.
19 Without the PRC’s investment during the 1950s–70s in 
rudimentary health care, education and infrastructure, all of which Mao 
personally championed as an expression of his revolutionary agenda and which 
he implemented (to varying degrees) through a series of mass campaigns, China’s 
subsequent economic gains appear inconceivable.
20 As John Fairbank observed at 
the outset of the reform era, “This rural industrialization bears the stamp of 
Chairman Mao … Tarnished or not, his monument is in the countryside”.
21
Bringing the Revolution Back In 
The prevalent claim today that the Chinese revolutionary tradition is “fading as 
the country is set to become one of the major economic powers of the twenty-first 
century”,
22 may therefore be open to qualification. One might argue instead that 
China’s stunning economic strides in the reform era can only be understood 
against the background of a revolutionary history that remains highly salient in 
many respects. To be sure, China’s weakly articulated legal and financial 
institutions (closely linked to its revolutionary past) may in time pose insuperable 
barriers to continued economic vitality. Regardless of whether China’s political 
system eventually proves to be a fetter on economic development, a number of 
elements of China’s revolutionary legacy have facilitated recent gains. Despite 
valiant philosophical efforts to bid “farewell to revolution”,
23  China’s 
revolutionary past has not yet been relegated to the dustbin of history. As 
Fairbank cautioned during the height of Deng Xiaoping’s reform effort, “China 
for all its spectacular modernization still faces the problems and perils of the 
social revolution …”
24
The Chinese revolutionary tradition cannot be equated simply with Soviet-
style Communism, important as the Soviet example (with its Leninist Party-state 
and command economy) assuredly was. Mao’s techniques of mass mobilization, 
born in revolutionary struggle but adapted to the tasks of post-revolutionary rule, 
                                                          
19   Rhoads  Murphey,  The Fading of the Maoist Vision: City and Country in China’s 
Development (New York: Methuen, 1980), pp. 54-55. 
20   On Mao’s stated commitment to these goals, see Stuart Schram (ed.), Chairman Mao Talks 
to the People: Talks and Letters, 1956-1971 (New York: Pantheon, 1974), pp. 197-233; on 
the implementation via mass campaigns, see Michel C. Oksenberg, Policy Formulation in 
China: The Case of the 1957–1958 Water Conservancy Campaign (Columbia University 
PhD dissertation, 1969) and Charles P. Cell, Revolution at Work: Mobilization Campaigns 
in China (New York: Academic Press, 1977).  
21   John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 4
th ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1979), p. 449. 
22   Proposal for conference to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the Fairbank Center for East 
Asian Research, Harvard University (December 2005). 
23    Li Zehou and Liu Zaifu, Gaobie geming: huiwang ershishiji Zhongguo (Farewell to 
Revolution: Looking Back on Twentieth-Century China) (Hong Kong: Tiandi Book 
Company, 1997). 
24   John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution, 1800-1985 (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1986), p. 351. 6      THE CHINA JOURNAL, No. 57 
lie at the heart of Chinese exceptionalism. Distinctions between Chinese and 
Russian variants of Communism, noted by Benjamin Schwartz more than half a 
century ago,
25  help to make sense of China’s current situation—which differs 
both from that of other post-Communist countries and from other developing 
countries, including India. Any serious study of the Chinese revolution and its 
aftermath, as Schwartz discovered, leads to an appreciation of the distinctions 
between Chinese and Soviet Communism—not to mention the even greater 
differences with countries that experienced neither social revolution nor 
Communism.
26
The curious paradox whereby certain elements of China’s revolutionary 
inheritance have actually furthered the stunningly successful implementation of 
market reforms has yet to be fully explored or explained by students of Chinese 
politics. To be sure, specific features of China’s “economic miracle” have been 
linked to Maoist precedents. In particular, the initial dynamism of township and 
village enterprises was often attributed to legacies of the collective era such as 
commune and brigade enterprises and the continuing influence of cadre control.
27
But while many scholars have plumbed the origins of (sometimes short-lived) 
local economic formations, few have tried to elucidate the defining elements of 
the larger political system within which such experiments have occurred. Taking 
a page from students of Latin America and Eastern Europe, China specialists 
routinely invoke the concept of “regime transition”, despite the fact that the post-
Mao period of PRC history has already lasted longer than the Maoist era that 
preceded it. Whether or not current political conditions persist for many more 
years, their distinguishing features are surely as worthy of careful attention and 
analysis as a previous generation of China scholars once showered upon the 
Maoist political system.
28
                                                          
25   Benjamin  I.  Schwartz,  Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1951). 
26   The opening of the Soviet archives in recent years has rekindled old debates about the extent 
to which the Chinese revolution simply replicated the Russian exemplar. For a partisan view 
that insists upon Soviet direction over virtually all aspects of the Chinese revolution, see 
Alexander Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution, 1919-1927 (Richmond: 
Curzon, 2000); a more balanced picture which argues for considerable autonomy and 
innovation on the part of the Chinese is presented in S. A. Smith, A Road is Made: 
Communism in Shanghai, 1920-27 (Richmond: Curzon, 2000).  
27   Jean C. Oi, Rural China Takes Off; Susan H. Whiting, Power and Wealth in Rural China: 
The Political Economy of Institutional Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2001).
28   A recent effort to explain élite dynamics under Mao (and Deng) in game-theoretic terms is 
Huang Jing, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). For a textbook overview of both Maoist and post-Mao systems, see 
Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2
nd ed. (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 2004). General essays on the topic by several political scientists can be 
found in Jonathan Unger (ed.), The Nature of Chinese Politics: From Mao to Jiang (Armonk: 
M. E. Sharpe, 2002). STUDYING CHINESE POLITICS      7 
If it is “transitional”, how has the current regime held onto power for three 
decades now, weathering a series of potentially destabilizing leadership 
successions (Mao to Hua to Deng to Jiang to Hu) while presiding over what may 
well be the fastest sustained economic and socio–cultural transformation that any 
nation has ever undergone? A large part of the complex answer to this question 
lies in the retention—and reinvention—of many elements of China’s 
revolutionary heritage. In moving from Maoist Communism to post-Mao 
authoritarianism, China has not simply jettisoned its revolutionary past as it 
“transits” toward a democratic future. Rather, a succession of post-Mao leaders 
have managed to fashion a surprisingly durable brand of “revolutionary 
authoritarianism” capable of withstanding challenges, including grievous and 
growing social and spatial inequalities, which would surely have undone less 
hardy regimes. The achievement is even more impressive when we remember 
that the geographical entity we now think of as “China” is of fairly recent vintage, 
a product of Qing imperial expansion that was reunited by first Nationalist and 
then Communist revolutionary armies.
29
As Andrew Nathan confesses in a recent mea culpa, “After the Tiananmen 
crisis … many China specialists and democracy theorists—myself among them—
expected the regime to fall to democratization’s ‘third wave.’ Instead, the regime 
has reconsolidated itself”.
30 Nathan proceeds to detail the ways in which the post-
Mao state has managed to institutionalize the elite succession process so as to 
overcome factionalist tendencies and thereby avoid the political crisis that many 
had once presumed to be its inevitable fate. Recognizing that political stability 
hinges on social support (or at the very least social acquiescence) as well as on 
state institutionalization, Nathan concedes that “there is much evidence from both 
quantitative and qualitative studies to suggest that … the regime as a whole 
continues to enjoy high levels of acceptance”.
31 To explain this puzzling degree 
of popularity for a government responsible for the Tiananmen massacre, Nathan 
points to the impact of various “input institutions”—local elections, letters-and-
visits departments, people’s congresses, administrative litigation, mass media—
that “enable citizens to pursue grievances without creating the potential to 
threaten the regime as a whole”.
32
Other explanations for the remarkable survival of China’s non-democratic 
polity focus on particular social forces. Drawing upon an influential social 
science literature that stresses either the bourgeoisie or industrial labor as the 
                                                          
29   On Qing expansion, see Peter Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central 
Eurasia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005). On the fragility of China’s 
geographical, political and cultural unity, see James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration 
(New York: Free Press, 1975); and Edward Friedman, National Identity and Democratic 
Prospects in Socialist China (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 
30   Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2003), 
p. 6. 
31   Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”, p. 13. 
32   Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”, pp.14-15. 8      THE CHINA JOURNAL, No. 57 
vanguard of democratization,
33  China scholars have observed that neither the 
rising class of entrepreneurs nor the declining class of state workers is pressing 
actively for political reform. Bound to the Party-state through a web of policies 
and institutions, the Chinese “bourgeoisie” expresses more interest in political 
stability than in political reform.
34  Indeed, a substantial portion of private 
entrepreneurs, welcomed by Jiang Zemin’s inclusiveness, have recently joined 
the Communist Party itself.
35 And although state workers, pensioners and laid-off 
and migrant laborers have all launched dramatic protests in recent years, their 
criticisms have tended more to evince nostalgia for the Maoist past than 
enthusiasm for liberal democracy.
36 Divided by region, generation and workplace 
conditions, aggrieved workers have been unable to form a united labor movement 
to press for improved labor standards—let alone a political movement to 
challenge the state.
37
Revealing as these analyses are, their focus on the interests and inclinations 
of social forces seems inadequate as an overall explanation for China’s “delayed 
democratization”.
38 Neither attitude surveys of enterprising business people nor 
                                                          
33    On the bourgeoisie, see Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy (Boston: Beacon, 1966); on the working class, see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 
Evelyn Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); on both, see Ruth Berins Collier, Paths 
Toward Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
34   Dorothy J. Solinger, “Urban Entrepreneurs and the State”, in Arthur Lewis Rosenbaum (ed.), 
State and Society in China: The Consequences of Reform (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 
121-41; Margaret M. Pearson, China’s New Business Elite: The Political Consequences of 
Economic Reform (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
35   Bruce  J.  Dickson,  Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and 
Prospects for Political Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Kellee S. 
Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy: The Politics of Private Sector Development in China 
(forthcoming). 
36   Ching Kwan Lee, “The Revenge of History: Collective Memories and Labor Protests in 
Northeastern China”, Ethnography, Vol. 1, No. 2 (December 2000), pp. 217-37, and “From 
the Specter of Mao to the Spirit of the Law: Labor Insurgency in China”, Theory and Society,
Vol. 31 (April 2002), pp. 189-228; Chen Feng, “Subsistence Crisis, Managerial Corruption 
and Labor Protests in China”, The China Journal, No. 44 (July 2000), pp. 41-63; William 
Hurst and Kevin J. O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners”, The China Quarterly, No. 
170 (June 2002), pp. 345-60; Cai Yongshun, “The Resistance of Chinese Laid-off Workers 
in the Reform Period”, The China Quarterly, No. 170 (June 2002), pp. 327-44. 
37   Ching Kwan Lee, “Pathways of Labour Insurgency”, in Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden 
(eds), Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, 2
nd edition (London: Routledge, 
2000), pp. 71-92. 
38   Mary Gallagher has proposed that the way in which foreign direct investment took place in 
China—occurring  before the advent of fundamental SOE reform or massive privatization—
worked to “delay democracy” by fragmenting and forestalling potential political opposition, 
as enterprises and workers alike were forced to compete for capital and jobs. Mary E. 
Gallagher, “Reform and Openness: Why China’s Economic Reforms Have Delayed 
Democracy”, World Politics, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2002), pp. 339-72.STUDYING CHINESE POLITICS      9 
interviews with restive workers are likely to shed as much light on the likelihood 
of regime change as a sober assessment of the techniques of rule perfected by the 
Chinese Communist state.
One key explanation for the survival of the PRC lies in the continuing 
strength of the Chinese Communist Party, especially its ability to recruit, monitor 
and reward the political élite.
39 Barry Naughton and Dali Yang point out that 
“China has retained a core element of central control: the nomenklatura system of 
personnel management” and argue that “this nomenklatura personnel system is 
the most important institution reinforcing national unity”.
40 In differentiating the 
Chinese trajectory from that of failed Communist states, Andrew Walder 
observes that “China’s Party hierarchy has survived unchanged”.
41 For Walder, 
cohesion among the top political leadership, state cadres and party members at 
large is the glue that holds the system together.
42 While the composition of the 
political elite has changed dramatically since Mao’s day (reflecting, among other 
things, an exponential growth in its educational credentials), its organizational 
structure has remained remarkably stable.
43
Crucial as these élite dynamics are, the regime’s future survival also rests 
upon its capacity to curb and channel potentially threatening social forces. 
Nathan’s discussion of “authoritarian resilience” is a valuable step in the 
direction of understanding state–society relations in the current period, but his 
conclusion that “China has made a transition from totalitarianism to a classic 
authoritarian regime”
44 seems to underestimate the numerous continuities from 
the Maoist to the post-Mao period. As many have pointed out, the term 
“totalitarianism” does not capture the extent to which Mao’s polity made room 
for social involvement.
45  Thanks to its Maoist heritage, moreover, China’s 
revolutionary authoritarianism is in some respects also quite unlike “a classic 
                                                          
39   Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, “Management of Party Cadres in China”, in Kjeld Erick Brødsgaard 
and Zheng Yongnian (eds), Bringing the Party Back In: How China is Governed (Singapore: 
Eastern Universities Press, 2004), pp. 57-91. 
40   Barry J. Naughton and Dali L. Yang (eds), Holding China Together: Diversity and National 
Integration in the Post-Deng Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 9. On 
the importance of the nomenklatura system during the 1980s, see Yasheng Huang, Inflation
and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of Central-Local Relations 
During the Reform Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
41   Andrew G. Walder, “The Party Elite”, p. 194.
42   Andrew G. Walder, “The Party Elite”, p.195-97. 
43    Hong Yung Lee, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Melanie Manion, Retirement of 
Revolutionaries in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 
44   Andrew J. Nathan, “Authoritarian Resilience”, p. 16. 
45   Critiques of the totalitarian model as a characterization of Mao’s China include Vivienne 
Shue, The Reach of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Body Politic (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1988) and Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986). 10      THE CHINA JOURNAL, No. 57 
authoritarian regime”. Although authoritarian regimes display considerable 
variation, Juan Linz notes that they generally share in common “the characteristic 
of low and limited political mobilization”.
46 Sidney Tarrow elaborates, 
That authoritarian states discourage popular politics is implicit in their very 
definition. In particular, they suppress the sustained interaction of collective 
actors and authorities that is the hallmark of social movements … Repressive 
states depress collective action of a conventional and confrontational sort, but 
leave themselves open to unobtrusive mobilization.
47
Like other authoritarian societies, the PRC has certainly witnessed the 
development of a “hidden transcript” of unobtrusive dissent.
48 But Communist 
China parts company with classic authoritarianism in having periodically 
encouraged—indeed compelled—its citizens to express their private criticisms 
publicly in the form of big-character-posters, struggle sessions, denunciation 
meetings, demonstrations and the like. The Cultural Revolution was the most 
dramatic, but not the last, expression of this state-sponsored effort at stimulating 
and shaping confrontational politics.  
“Revolutionary Authoritarianism”: From Divide and Conquer to Divide and 
Rule
The post-Mao leadership, following the example set by the Great Helmsman, has 
proven adept at the art of creating coalitions with, and cleavages among, key 
social elements as a means of stimulating popular political involvement so as to 
bolster its own political hegemony. This core feature of China’s revolutionary 
authoritarianism reflects hard-won lessons learned in the course of decades of 
life-or-death struggles. As Chen Yung-fa details in his insightful study of the 
wartime base areas, the Chinese Communists’ methods of revolutionary 
mobilization (and de-mobilization) comprised a remarkably flexible and highly 
effective strategy, perfected over many years of trial-and-error practice in diverse 
geographical settings.
49 Despite all the calls for nationalism and national unity 
issued by Mao and his comrades during the War of Resistance against Japan, 
their real recipe for revolutionary success lay in identifying and intensifying 
domestic tensions in a manner that enhanced the power of the emerging 
Communist Party-state. A wide variety of social contradictions were reinterpreted 
as “class struggles” that required CCP intervention and direction. Chen aptly 
characterized the Communists’ approach as one of “controlled polarization”.
50
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The history of state–society relations under the PRC is largely the 
application of this revolutionary lesson to the task of regime consolidation. 
Nationalistic rhetoric continued to be tempered by a politics of division. As Chen 
observes, “there was no sharp break between wartime and postwar Chinese 
communism”.
51 A strategy of divide-and-conquer was adapted to one of divide-
and-rule. The key institutions of the Maoist era such as work units (danwei)
which isolated the industrial labor force, people’s communes (renmin gongshe)
that enforced rural self-sufficiency, job allocations (fenpei) that rendered 
intellectuals dependent upon state favor, labor insurance (laobao) that bestowed 
generous welfare benefits upon permanent workers at state-owned enterprises 
while leaving the majority of the workforce unprotected, personnel dossiers 
(dang’an) which marked citizens with “good” or “bad” political records, 
household registrations (hukou) that separated urban and rural dwellers, class 
labels (jieji chengfen) that categorized people into “five kinds of red” (hong wulei)
and “five kinds of black” (hei wulei) —all served to divide society and foster 
subservience to the state.
52
Contrary to what some have suggested, this social fragmentation and 
dependence on the state did not amount to a “totalitarianism” that robbed the 
Chinese populace of a capacity for protest—quite the opposite.
53  Just  as 
“controlled polarization”, waged under the unifying banner of nationalism, 
facilitated a peasant revolution of staggering size and scope, so it also provided 
the framework for the huge mass movements for which the People’s Republic of 
China has been renowned.
54 Participants in mass criticisms and demonstrations of 
various sorts routinely organized themselves along officially prescribed lines. 
Even in the post-Mao “democracy movement” of 1989, often characterized as the 
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most “autonomous” of contemporary Chinese demonstrations, protesters marched 
through Tiananmen Square behind banners announcing their state-designated
units (for example, the Capital Iron and Steel Works, or the Propaganda 
Department of the Central Committee). This reliance upon state-supplied 
organizations and identities permitted rapid mobilization (and de-mobilization) at 
the same time as it undercut the potential for collective protest to escalate into a 
fundamental challenge to the state.   
Although Maoist institutions have undergone substantial transformation in 
the reform era, earlier practices retain significant residual power.
55 Today urban 
registrations may be purchased by the well-to-do as well as inherited, but they 
remain a crucial means for gaining access to educational opportunity. Jobs are 
now often procured via market mechanisms rather than by state fiat, yet 
personnel dossiers continue to play a role in promotions, sensitive assignments, 
and the like. The changing operations of these Maoist institutions, along with the 
emergence of new organizations, such as “homeowners’ associations” (yezhu hui)
and “communities” (shequ) to replace residents’ committees, demand our careful 
attention and analysis if we are to understand the multiple means, coercive as 
well as cooptative, by which the Chinese state manages to hold its restive 
citizenry in check. 
It is worth reiterating that these mechanisms have never prevented the 
Chinese populace from demonstrating an impressive appetite for contentious 
politics—whether in Mao’s day or today.
 56  Mao himself of course inspired a 
good deal of just such activity through the purposeful stirring up of popular 
contradictions and criticisms. In the post-Mao era as well, central leaders have 
sometimes (implicitly if not explicitly) encouraged ordinary people to take to the 
streets as a means of furthering élite agendas.
57  Although social groups often 
respond to state-initiated opportunities by airing complaints that exceed official 
bounds, both the mobilization and the de-mobilization of mass movements 
proceed along state-designated occupational and territorial lines and thus 
reinforce social cleavages in favor of state control.
58
In every decade since the founding of the PRC, state power has appeared to 
have been challenged: during the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956–57, the 
                                                          
55   Dorothy  J.  Solinger,  Contesting Citizenship in Urban China (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999). 
56   Elizabeth J. Perry, “To Rebel is Justified: Cultural Revolution Influences on Contemporary 
Chinese Protest”, in Kam-yee Law (ed.), Beyond Purge and Holocaust: The Chinese 
Cultural Revolution Reconsidered (Palgrave Press, 2003), pp. 262-81. 
57   Notable examples include Deng Xiaoping and the Democracy Wall movement of 1978–79; 
Hu Yaobang and the student protests of 1986–87; Zhao Ziyang and the Tiananmen unrest of 
1989; Hu Jintao and anti-Japanese demonstrations in 1999 and later. See Elizabeth J. Perry, 
Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China (Armonk: M. 
E. Sharpe, 2002), Introduction, pp. ix-xxxii. 
58   Sebastian Heilmann, “The Social Context of Mobilization in China: Factions, Work Units 
and Activists During the 1976 April Fifth Movement”, China Information, No. 8 (Winter 
1993-94), pp. 1-19.  STUDYING CHINESE POLITICS      13 
Cultural Revolution of 1966-69, the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978–79, the 
Tiananmen uprising of 1989 and the Falun Gong demonstrations of 1999. But in 
each case the central leadership (while invoking the rhetoric of national unity) 
has adroitly applied the techniques of divide and rule. Public security forces, 
augmented by military units if necessary, work to ensure that various social 
groups—especially workers and intellectuals—do not join hands.
59 During  the 
Hundred Flowers movement, the massive strikes that swept through China’s 
factories remained isolated from the big-character-poster campaign being waged 
on university campuses. That summer the suppression of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign (directed by Deng Xiaoping) applied different criminal “hats” to 
worker and student activists—symbolizing their distinctive political status. 
Although the early weeks of the Cultural Revolution saw student Red Guards 
take their struggles to the factories, within a few months they were prohibited 
from such activities; and eventually the tide was reversed as propaganda teams of 
workers, often accompanied by PLA soldiers, moved into the schools to restore 
order. A decade later, the harsh fifteen-year sentence meted out to Democracy 
Wall activist Wei Jingsheng in 1979 reflected his embodiment of dual worker and 
intellectual status more than his incendiary calls for a “fifth modernization” of 
democratic freedoms. In 1989, the very different punishments suffered by 
students and workers active in the protests again illustrates the Deng Xiaoping 
regime’s divide and rule strategy (student leaders were detained and then released 
while worker leaders were often executed).
Long segregated into separate state-created categories, citizens themselves 
are often inclined to accept these divisions as a normal part of the political order. 
Consider the following incident. In the winter of 1986–87, large-scale student 
demonstrations broke out in Shanghai after police brutality during a concert by an 
American rock group. During the concert, several college students who had 
responded enthusiastically to the performers’ invitation to dance in the aisles 
were hauled outdoors and beaten. Fellow students, and then workers, poured into 
the streets to protest against the police action. On orders from Jiang Zemin, then 
mayor of Shanghai, barricades were erected at People’s Square to prevent 
workers from entering the ranks of the student protesters. Only those with valid 
student IDs were permitted inside the police cordon. Workers massed just outside 
the barricades, tossing in bread and cigarettes and shouting “Younger brothers, 
your elder brothers support you!” To defuse this potentially explosive situation, 
Jiang Zemin went in person to the university of the students who had been 
roughed up to deliver an apology on behalf of the city government. He explained 
to the tense all-campus assembly that the police had mistaken the students for 
workers, which was the reason they had reacted so harshly. Even more surprising 
in this self-proclaimed “workers’ state” was the fact that the professors and 
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students in attendance reported that they found nothing inappropriate in the 
mayor’s explanation.
60
Jiang Zemin’s skillful deployment of the familiar strategy of divide and rule 
won him the attention of Deng Xiaoping. After being tapped for central 
leadership during the 1989 protests, Jiang put these techniques to effective use in 
responding to a wide range of potential challenges. His regime dealt extremely 
harshly with movements (such as the China Democracy Party and Falun Gong) 
that boasted a socially and regionally diverse membership but showed 
considerable leniency toward conflicts that were more homogeneous in 
composition and locale. Indeed, Jiang’s government even endorsed and 
encouraged some single-issue protests (for example, the student demonstrations 
against the US bombing of China’s Belgrade embassy in the spring of 1999).
61
While Jiang Zemin relied upon familiar revolutionary methods of “controlled 
polarization” to tame social forces, the inclusive ideology that he attempted to 
formulate (and to propagate through a series of Maoist-style ideological 
campaigns) reinforced the official stress on national unity. Jiang’s Three
Represents—by which the Communist Party is supposed to serve as the 
representative of “advanced productive forces, advanced culture, and the interests 
of the overwhelming majority of the people”—was an effort to update Mao’s 
“mass line”. Moreover, as Jiang’s own rise to the pinnacle of power was tied to 
the state’s verdict on the 1989 protest movement as a “counter-revolutionary 
rebellion”, his scope for ideological innovation was limited.  
Jiang Zemin’s much-publicized campaign against Falun Gong resorted to 
divisive revolutionary rhetoric by branding the “evil cult” as “counter-
revolutionary”.
62   Jiang’s successor as General-Secretary of the Chinese 
Communist Party, Hu Jintao, has also repeatedly summoned revolutionary 
symbolism in justifying his party’s claim to rule. On a visit to the site of the 
former Jiangxi Soviet in the summer of 2003, Hu enjoined officials at all levels 
of the party to “carry on the revolutionary tradition”. As Hu put it, “Comrade 
Mao Zedong and other revolutionaries of the elder generation not only made 
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historical achievements by realizing national independence and liberation, but 
also bequeathed to us precious spiritual wealth”. A front-page article in People’s
Daily elaborated on Hu’s remarks: “such revolutionary spirit and tradition, which 
were fostered through arduous struggles, provide strength for overcoming 
difficulties and risks of all kinds in our way forward”.
63 Hu’s subsequent slogan 
of “building a harmonious society” has not displaced the recourse to 
revolutionary mobilization techniques.  
The 2003 battle waged against SARS was a telling example of how the new 
leadership adapted Maoist tactics to cope with contemporary challenges. In what 
Hu Jintao dubbed the “People’s War against SARS”, neighborhood committees 
were charged with enforcing strict sanitation standards within their jurisdictions. 
Activists (some dressed as that passé paragon of Maoist virtues, Lei Feng) went 
from door to door to ensure that the public adhered to the government’s 
guidelines.
64 Reminiscent of public health campaigns in Mao’s day (such as the 
campaign against schistosomiasis or the campaign against the Four Pests), the 
anti-SARS effort attested to the continuing capacity of the regime to mobilize its 
citizenry behind state-initiated projects.  
Slogans recalled the patriotic battle cries of an earlier era: “Activate the 
whole Party, mobilize the entire populace, win the war of annihilation against 
SARS!”; “Enlarge the national spirit, unite with one heart to battle SARS!”
Despite the calls for unity, the tactics were draconian: tens of thousands of people 
were forcibly placed under strict quarantine; countless civet cats, chickens and 
other possible disease-carriers were slaughtered with little concern for the 
consequences, and so on.
65 Those who succumbed to the disease were designated 
“national heroes” and “martyrs”, and their survivors became eligible to receive 
the same state-conferred benefits (free schooling, generous medical insurance and 
the like) that this exalted status had long conferred on the dependents of 
“revolutionary martyrs”.
66   While the PRC’s response to SARS was 
understandably criticized by some policy analysts for its “out-dated mode of 
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crisis management”,
67   in retrospect the effort to resuscitate seemingly 
anachronistic campaign methods for new purposes appears to have been quite 
successful. Joan Kaufman, highlighting the Chinese government’s ability “to 
detain and isolate citizens”, observes that the resort to Maoist-style public 
campaigns “was precisely what was required to put in place the series of 
preventive measures that broke the chain of transmission”.
68 A summary article in 
the Journal of the American Medical Association concludes approvingly that “the 
multiple control measures implemented in Beijing likely led to the rapid 
resolution of the SARS outbreak”.
69
The current PRC leadership is not content simply to make instrumental use 
of Maoist mobilization tactics. It also tries actively to instill a sense of 
revolutionary continuity among officials and ordinary people alike. Following Hu 
Jintao’s visit to Jiangxi, a branch of the Central Party School was opened at the 
site of Mao’s first rural revolutionary base area in the Jinggangshan highlands, so 
that cadres could reconnect with their revolutionary roots (while “roughing it” at 
one of the two three-star hotels located within the spacious party school 
compound!).
70 For ordinary citizens, “red tourism” (hongse lüyou) to the sacred 
sites of Mao’s revolution is being vigorously promoted as a means both of 
improving the party’s public image (by showcasing its past struggles and 
sacrifices) and as a vehicle for pumping much needed revenues into what remain 
some of the poorest regions of the countryside. 
With such state-promoted glorification of the revolutionary tradition, it is not 
surprising that contemporary protesters should attempt to capitalize on this 
“precious spiritual wealth” to further their own purposes. At the Anyuan coal 
mine in Jiangxi, where in 1922 Mao Zedong, Li Lisan and Liu Shaoqi had 
organized the first working-class branch of the Chinese Communist Party and 
instigated the first successful industrial strike under CCP direction, retired miners 
in 2004 called attention to that history: “During the years of revolutionary 
struggle, Anyuan workers suffered and sacrificed for the sake of the Chinese 
revolution … Under the reforms, thanks to the exertions of our generation of 
miners, the enterprise has profited and prospered and yet we have not enjoyed the 
fruits of reform. Our wages have been cut and our pensions are very, very 
meager”.
71
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Today’s protesters draw not only rhetorical but also practical inspiration 
from revolutionary precedents. Faced with the threat of bankruptcy triggered by 
post-Mao industrial policies, disgruntled workers have once again been 
organizing militia units to protect their factories—in conscious imitation of the 
revolutionary exemplar.
72 But this time they hope to “liberate” their workplaces 
from forced closures by the Party. Political scientist Feng Chen reports on a 
recent scene at a Shanghai plastics factory: 
As some workers proudly describe it, their action of defending the factory is 
similar to that of their predecessors on the eve of the Communist takeover in 
1949 when pro-Communist workers formed “worker guard teams” [gongren
jiuchadui] to protect factories from sabotage by the Guomindang. Ironically, 
however, the workers are now using the same method to ward off capitalistic 
takeovers endorsed by a party-state that still labels itself socialist.
73
Similar confrontations, pitting “revolutionary” workers against “reformist” 
government authorities, have taken place in many other parts of the country as 
well. Despite the use of revolutionary nomenclature and symbolism, such labor 
protests are not proto-revolutionary movements poised to topple the state. Rather, 
aggrieved workers draw creatively upon the language and legacy of the 
Communist revolution in an effort to shame the Party-state into living up to the 
promises of its own “revolutionary tradition”.  
The Consequences of Revolutionary Authoritarianism 
The tendency for protesters to take cues from officially approved symbols of 
authority can be found in any polity, but is especially pronounced in authoritarian 
systems where the state exercises a virtual monopoly over political discourse. In 
such contexts, the clever appropriation and inversion of officially sanctioned 
slogans and practices is a prominent feature of (often unobtrusive) protest 
behavior.
74  Under the revolutionary authoritarianism of the PRC, where mass 
mobilization has been a hallmark of state–society relations, the practice of 
“waving the red flag to oppose the red flag” has been honed to a high—and often 
highly ironic—art form.
75 Sebastian Heilmann observed this phenomenon among 
workers seeking wage hikes and improved workplace conditions during the 
Cultural Revolution: 
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In most cases, angry workers skillfully made use of official campaign slogans to 
camouflage their “economistic” interests. Officially approved slogans like 
“Down With the Capitalist Roaders” were deliberately used as a means of 
confronting an unresponsive leadership ... Under the cloak of rebellion against 
“revisionist” forces, diverse groups of workers used the opportunity to complain 
about specific grievances in their respective work units and about economic 
hardship.
76
The turmoil of the Cultural Revolution originated in part from Mao Zedong’s 
effort to stem the tide of “revisionism” by cultivating “revolutionary successors” 
among the younger generation. Although student Red Guards (and other social 
groups) strayed far from Mao’s vision of proper revolutionary activity, they were 
nonetheless constrained by the fact that their “revolution” had been launched by 
the Chairman of the Communist Party himself.  
Once Mao was gone, it became commonplace among students of Chinese 
politics to suggest that contemporary popular protest exhibits a degree of 
spontaneity and independence that marks it as qualitatively different from the 
mobilized movements of Mao’s day. Despite the pivotal role of Deng Xiaoping 
in first encouraging and then suppressing the Democracy Wall movement of 
1978–79, foreign observers hailed it as an unprecedented expression of citizen-
based pressures for democratization.
77 A decade later, the Tiananmen uprising of 
1989 led many scholars to express excitement about what they saw as a 
fundamental break with previous campaign-style modes of popular involvement. 
Andrew Walder described participation in the Tiananmen uprising of 1989 as 
“something new on the political scene: massive, independent, popular protests. 
The old mode of regimentation and elite-sponsored turbulence has been broken, 
and Chinese politics appears to have entered a new era”.
78 Similarly,  Wang 
Shaoguang argued that “the protest movement of 1989 marked a turning point of 
changing class relations ... the working class in China is no longer a pillar of 
continuity but a force for change”.
79 The notion of a qualitative transformation 
was picked up by general comparativists as well. Jack Goldstone wrote of 1989 
that “unlike other confrontations that involved mainly intellectuals, such as the 
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Hundred Flowers Movement, or other events that were in some sense 
orchestrated by the regime, such as the Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen marked 
the first time that intellectuals and popular elements acted independently to 
challenge the regime”.
80
More than fifteen years after Tiananmen, however, it is increasingly difficult 
to regard that confrontation as having signaled a dramatic turning point in state–
society relations. Sober reflections on the activities of Tiananmen protesters—
including retrospectives by some of the principals themselves—question the 
extent to which their behavior in the spring of 1989 constituted a genuine rupture 
with earlier modes of protest. As Tiananmen activist Liu Xiaobo conceded in a 
bitterly impassioned essay entitled “That Holy Word: ‘Revolution’”, 
Most of the resources and methods we made use of to mobilize the masses were 
ones that the Communist Party itself had used many times before … As soon as 
we began our revolution, we became extremely conceited—just as if we had 
reverted to the time of the Cultural Revolution and felt ourselves to be the most 
revolutionary. As soon as we joined the 1989 protest movement, we considered 
ourselves to be the most democratic. After all, had we not fasted for democracy 
and devoted ourselves to it and made sacrifices for it? … Our voice became the 
only truth. We felt as though we possessed absolute power.
 81
Liu’s reflections are a stinging indictment of the Tiananmen protest as an 
undemocratic movement that unwittingly recreated many of the core features of 
Chinese Communist revolutionary culture. The searing experience of the state-
orchestrated Cultural Revolution in particular, according to Liu Xiaobo, 
continued to inhibit the development of a genuinely democratic perspective. 
Despite its bloody suppression, the 1989 uprising did not end popular protest 
in China, and many scholars continue to see the signs of an imminent 
breakthrough in state–society relations in the most recent ferment. Kevin O’Brien 
and Li Lianjiang see the tendency of restive farmers to cite official government 
regulations and policies in justifying their (sometimes unruly) behavior as 
“rightful resistance” and argue that it reflects a growing sense of “citizenship 
rights” among ordinary Chinese.
82 David Zweig also detects an emerging “rights 
conscious peasantry”.
83  Pei Minxin, discussing the impact of rapid economic 
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development as well as the implementation of legal reforms such as the 
Administrative Litigation Law, notes a “rising rights consciousness” within 
Chinese society at large. Summing up the history of the reform era with an eye 
toward the future, Pei predicts that “China’s incipient opposition is likely to 
become more resilient, sophisticated and adept in challenging the regime as the 
conditions for democratic resistance further improve”.
84 Merle Goldman argues 
that “by the century’s end the sense of rights consciousness … had spread … 
beyond intellectual and elite circles … to the population at large … [T]he 
transition from comrade to citizen in the People’s Republic of China has 
begun”.
85 This optimistic outlook pervades much of the journalistic reporting on 
China as well; a recent Business Week article, for example, speaks glowingly of 
“a new labor-rights revolution sweeping China”.
86
Such arguments about the growth of Chinese social power, fueled by 
newfound conceptions of citizenship, dovetail with a prevalent view of the post-
Mao state as a pale shadow of its predecessor—sapped of both the desire and the 
capacity fully to control society at large. David Shambaugh observes: “If one of 
the hallmarks of the Maoist state was the penetration of society, then the Dengist 
state was noticeable for its withdrawal. The organizational mechanisms of state 
penetration and manipulation were substantially reduced or dismantled 
altogether”.
87  Ding Xueliang characterizes the post-Mao state as gripped by a 
legitimacy crisis that and a “gradual functional and organizational decay of the 
massive party-state machinery”.
88  The result, Pei Minxin concludes, is “the 
erosion of state capacity in China”.
89
I am skeptical both of such accounts of state withdrawal or weakness and of 
claims of a new and growing awareness of rights-based citizenship in 
contemporary China. It is true that protesters today routinely invoke the language 
of “rights” in pressing their demands, as is only to be expected in the light of 
widespread government propaganda promoting the importance of such state-
conferred “rights”.
90 Bookstores these days are stocked with pamphlets detailing 
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government laws, policies and regulations; the air waves are filled by radio talk 
shows that advise listeners on how to ensure that regulations are enforced and 
contracts are fulfilled; newspapers are replete with legal advice columns for 
aggrieved citizens; and so on.
91  But post-Mao state proclamations heralding 
“reform” and “legal rights” bear a certain parallelism to Maoist state propaganda 
harping on “revolution” and “class struggle”. Just as protesters during the Maoist 
era borrowed the then hegemonic language of class in pressing their demands, so 
protesters today adopt the currently hegemonic language of rights in framing 
their grievances. This phenomenon, in my view, is “rules consciousness” rather 
than “rights consciousness”.
92  Instead of indicating some novel expression of 
proto-democratic citizenship or state vulnerability, the continuing adherence to 
rules consciousness seems to me to reflect a seasoned sensitivity on the part of 
ordinary Chinese to (changing yet still powerful) top-down signals emanating 
from the state.
93
Revolutionary authoritarianism demands active engagement (rather than 
“exit”) by society, in a manner authorized by the state. People are encouraged to 
express “voice” as well as “loyalty”,
94 so long as they play by the official rules of 
the game. For these reasons, although protest in Communist China has been more 
frequent and widespread than in other authoritarian settings, ultimately it has 
proven less politically destabilizing. Precisely because protest in the PRC is both 
routine and officially circumscribed, once the top leadership decides upon a 
course of repression most of the populace is quick to fall into step. The 
crackdown on Tiananmen protesters in 1989 or Falun Gong demonstrators a 
decade later was after all a familiar drill harking back to the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign of 1957, the military suppression of Cultural Revolution mass activism 
in 1968, the clearing of Tiananmen Square in April 1976 and the clampdown on 
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Democracy Wall in 1979. In China, unlike Eastern Europe or the former Soviet 
Union, both leaders and ordinary citizens know how to put the genie of mass 
protest back into the bottle of state socialism. 
One might well ask whether this is only a temporary situation, now that 
educated engineers rather than experienced revolutionaries occupy 
Zhongnanhai.
95   Has the revolutionary tradition lost its intrinsic value for 
contemporary Chinese, rulers and ruled alike, much as Joseph Levenson argued 
was the fate of the Confucian tradition a century ago?
96 Will today’s Communist 
reformers find it as impossible to cling to their discredited traditions as the Qing 
self-strengtheners once did? Just as the abolition of the Confucian examinations 
was a clear acknowledgment of bureaucratic weakness and moral bankruptcy in 
1905, the CCP’s resort to an open-door policy that welcomes even capitalists into 
Party is a clear acknowledgment of its own moribund condition.  
It is entirely possible that the engineers responsible for running the train of 
Chinese Communism will soon discover that they cannot proceed full steam 
ahead along an outmoded set of rails. Advanced economic development may 
indeed demand new political arrangements that afford far greater autonomy to 
legal institutions and civil society. Without a willingness on the part of its 
leadership to risk the consequences of such a political transformation, the PRC 
could devolve into a run-of-the-mill authoritarianism that dispenses with both the 
ideological and the organizational features of its revolutionary past. Even if this 
“transition” to stable authoritarianism should occur (as some suggest it already 
has),
97 we would still be well advised to cast a more discerning eye back upon the 
past quarter-century. Tarnished as the extraordinary, and quite unanticipated, 
accomplishments of the post-Mao polity may be, their explanation nevertheless 
presents a major challenge to the field of Chinese politics. That challenge, I 
would submit, cannot be fully met by comparisons with other countries (whether 
post-Communist, “classic” authoritarian or developmental), nor by recourse to 
general theories of regime transition and democratization.
98 For better and worse, 
China has yet to bid farewell to revolution. 
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